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Abstract 
If acting morally can be viewed as acting consistently with a moral principle or rule, 
then being a person with moral integrity can be viewed as consistently applying moral 
principles or rules across different types of situations.  We advance a view of moral 
integrity that incorporates three distinct, but interrelated, types of moral consistency: 
cognitive, emotional and motivational moral consistency. Our approach is based on 
Self-Determination Theory, a motivational theory that can explain when a moral rule 
becomes the primary motive for behavior. We argue that moral integrity is achieved 
when a person acts on the basis of an internal moral system of principles, emotions 
and motives and provide an account of the way that it develops during a person’s 
interaction with the environment.    
 Keywords: self-determination theory, moral integrity, cognitive consistency, 
morality, emotional integration  
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Consistency and Moral Integrity: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective 
Consistency is a concept that emerges in most discussions of morality. Its importance 
is exemplified through the exploration of moral dilemmas, such as the trolley problem 
(Foot, 1967), which are used extensively in moral psychology and philosophy. It is 
not unusual for two moral principles, which both seem to be adopted by an individual, 
to support two utterly incompatible courses of action. Think of a scientist who 
simultaneously believes that i) it is a mother’s duty to provide for her children and ii) 
science should never be used to cause suffering. Faced with the moral dilemma of 
either working for the weapons industry or allowing her children to starve, the 
scientist must reassess her moral principles, as they seem to contradict each other. 
This does not necessarily imply that the principles are always inconsistent. However, 
the core concern here seems to be related to some form of inconsistency, which 
emerges when applying the principles to certain situations. In line with deontological 
and rule utilitarian philosophical approaches, we will focus on (in)consistency of 
behavior with a principle. The term consistency will not refer to behavioral 
consistency, the lack of which is not a sign of moral failing once the complexity of 
social situations is taken into account (Nucci, 2019). We will instead focus on the type 
of consistency that allows individuals to behave in a principled manner.  
Although the situation in the above example might appear theoretical and rare, 
people will face different moral challenges of a smaller or larger magnitude.  A 
person of moral integrity should be able to resolve moral dilemmas and consistently 
act in a principled manner. This implies the possession of attributes that enable or 
cause moral behavior consistently. One way to discuss moral consistency is to focus 
on personality traits, such as the Honesty-Humility dimension of the HEXACO model 
of personality (Ashton, Lee, & De Vries, 2014) and the conscientiousness dimension 
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of a Five-Factor model (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993), or on the broader 
concept of moral character (Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014; for 
a critical view on character see Doris, 2002). According to this approach, an 
individual with certain ‘moral’ character traits would act according to these relatively 
stable traits, which produce moral acts with high cross-situational consistency. 
However, this type of character-focused consistency whereby a trait is seen as a broad 
‘moral’ quality is not likely to help our scientist when two moral principles are in 
conflict, as in the case of the moral dilemma presented above. These types of moral 
dilemmas serve as a reminder of the complexity of moral consistency. Regardless of 
which option the scientist opts for, she could be described as both consistent and 
inconsistent, depending on various factors, including how strongly she is committed 
to the moral principles in question. The principles per se are not inherently 
inconsistent, as mentioned above, for one can be a humanitarian scientist and a self-
sacrificing responsible parent at the same time. In fact, in most cases, she will be able 
to make a choice that is consistent with both humanitarianism and parental 
responsibility. However, in this particular situation, she needs to rely on more settled 
views on the relative importance of these principles. 
To add to the difficulty of ‘weighing’ principles properly, social situations 
offer subtle contextual cues, which influence the perceived relevance or importance of 
the principles. Take for example the classic Good Samaritan experiment (Darley & 
Batson, 1973), in which seminary students were placed in a position in which they 
could help a person in need, as they passed him by in an alleyway. Instead of their 
level of religiosity predicting helping behavior, it was a situational variable, namely 
whether participants were in a hurry, that predicted the offer of help. Since 
participants were on their way to give a talk, it can be argued that they also felt that 
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they had a duty to be on time. Therefore, when they were in a hurry, that duty became 
salient and overpowered the duty to help. The force of situational aspects is often 
subtle, but powerful. If we consider moral individuals as individuals that behave 
morally in a consistent manner, then they should be able to do so in different types of 
situations that pose significant challenges for consistency. If it is important for them 
to help people in need, then they should be able to properly weigh the importance of 
the probability of being five minutes late for giving a talk.  
At the same time as resolving conflict between two seemingly opposing 
principles in complex situations, moral individuals should not only behave 
consistently with moral principles that are objectively perceived so or imposed by 
others; they should endorse the principles themselves in a state of reflective 
endorsement (Korsgaard, 1996). In a psychological, motivational account of morality 
that draws from Self-Determination Theory (SDT), Arvanitis (2017) argued that this 
is only possible at the motivational state of integrated regulation, where coherence 
and consistency of the moral rule with a person’s broader value system is possible. A 
person who has achieved such an appropriate level of consistency may be able to 
resolve these conflicts through a system of values, moral rules and principles in a 
scheme that is reminiscent of Frankfurt’s self-integration scheme of first-order desires 
and second-order desires, i.e. desires about desires (Frankfurt, 1987). Morality in this 
case relies on a level of consistency that would allow a person to resolve moral 
dilemmas by being able to determine which moral principles properly apply and how 
to prioritize them. 
This is arguably the essence of moral integrity: having an internal moral 
system as a guide for behavior in the context of different situations. Thinking of 
integrity in terms of this moral system, and not in terms of a general moral propensity, 
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allows us to approach the way in which individuals with moral integrity deal with 
everyday moral challenges. The question we will here consider is how such an 
internal moral system develops. We will move past trait-based and situational-based 
accounts and use the framework of SDT, which views human motivation in light of 
the organism’s continuous interaction with the environment. During that interaction 
and with the proper nutriments, a person is able to integrate aspects of the 
environment and resolve inconsistencies (Ryan & Deci, 2017). In terms of moral 
rules, we argue that the inconsistencies may be of cognitive, emotional and 
motivational nature, as explained below. By the end of our analysis, it should become 
evident how we can approach moral integrity in terms of this three-fold moral 
consistency that develops during the organism’s interaction with the environment. 
Cognitive consistency 
Cognition is an intuitively appealing starting point for the study of moral behavior. 
However, resolving cognitive inconsistencies in order to achieve consistency with a 
moral rule is not a simple endeavor. Moral rules can be thought of as cognitive 
elements prescribing behavior. There may be higher order rules, such as general 
principles of human interaction, and lower order rules, such as specific work rules. 
According to Balance Theory (Heider, 1958), people will seek balance among these 
different prescriptions and their behavior. This, in itself, is not an easy task to 
undertake. Even on a strictly rational level, an individual would be required to 
construct a hierarchy of rules, with general principles at the top and lower rules at the 
bottom, in order to behave morally with a high level of consistency. This sketch of 
consistency is similar to Frankfurt’s effort to describe the integrated self as a 
consistent self who fully identifies with different levels of volitions (for example, 
desires for valuable things generate first-order volitions and desires to desire valuable 
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things generate second-order volitions). Our ability to reflect on these volitions and 
attach different weights to them is, at least in part, responsible for the existence of this 
two-level scheme. So, a person with integrity does not act randomly according to the 
most powerful desire at any given moment but rather reflects on it and critically 
assesses what she values in order to create a harmonious system (Frankfurt, 1971). 
Our scientist, of course, seems to have a different kind of problem, as two higher-
order desires to abide by her chosen moral principles are in conflict.  In real life, even 
harmonizing higher and lower-order rules can be tricky. A higher, universal principle 
might be that people ought not to lie, while a lower rule might be that negotiation 
should be conducted with frankness. If, in some cases, individuals may think it would 
be best not to tell the truth, then they would be required to classify their behavior 
either as something other than a lie (maybe a white lie) or as a lie altogether and 
produce an overarching principle, for example the protection of the dignity of others, 
that would compensate for the initial inconsistency with the ‘no-lying’ principle. Even 
this seemingly simple example will find seasoned philosophers disagreeing on a 
consistent set of principles and rules that would prescribe moral behavior in all given 
circumstances. 
 The path toward consistency is more challenging than the preceding 
discussion reveals. In their attempt to achieve consistency of rules, principles, and 
behavior, individuals are susceptible to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), 
especially when they have a sense of personal responsibility and are likely to bring 
about aversive consequences with their actions (Cooper & Fazio, 1984) or, more 
generally, when their freely chosen behavior violates important aspects of the self-
concept (Thibodeau, & Aronson, 1992). More relevant to our discussion is the self-
standards model of cognitive dissonance (Stone & Cooper, 2001), where dissonance 
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is considered to be experienced when there is a discrepancy between individuals’ 
behavior and their self-expectancies for the self-attributes of competence and 
morality. According to this account, the process involves a comparison between 
behavior and a self-standard brought to mind in a specific context, for example 
between the behavior of bluffing and the self-standard of sincere interaction with 
others. Individuals may resolve the discomfort experienced by a perceived 
discrepancy through attitude change, self-justification, even trivialization of dissonant 
cognitions (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995) or, in our case, trivialization of a 
moral principle or rule. Dissonance may thus lead to rationalizations that aim to 
protect self-esteem, even at the expense of the moral character of a person’s behavior 
or attitude. An extreme example is the derogation of a victim, when people feel they 
cannot alleviate her suffering (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). A pertinent account of self-
protective rationalization is offered by Bandura’s (1999) theory of moral 
disengagement, particularly stressing the role of moral agency.  
 According to the account presented above, on the one hand, cognitive 
consistency can facilitate the alignment of behavior with higher moral rules and, on 
the other hand, it may lead to the distortion of moral rules for the protection of a 
person’s self-esteem. In the latter case, individuals exhibit selective attention in order 
to avoid ego-threatening information and cling to ego-enhancing interpretations, 
thereby facilitating the compartmentalization or fracturing of the self (Brown & Ryan, 
2004). For example, a person may both adopt the scruples of a ruthless entrepreneur at 
work and abide by the role of a loving father at home so long as the two are relatively 
isolated within the psyche (Ryan & Deci, 2003). Such compartmentalization allows 
individuals to defend themselves against negative self-attributes and negative feelings 
that accompany unethical behavior. Conversely, integration would allow individuals 
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to confront unethical behavior (Thomas, Ditzfeld, & Showers, 2013). Our scientist’s 
response to her dilemma will not be morally sound on all grounds if the principles are 
compartmentalized and the scientist is protected from facing the fact that, in these 
circumstances, she cannot be both a responsible mother and a humanitarian. It is 
therefore not enough for individuals to employ cognitive resources in order to create a 
coherent hierarchy of moral principles and rules; there are deeper self-related 
processes that facilitate moral consistency.  
Even with this initial discussion on the role of cognitive consistency in 
morality, it becomes evident that moral integrity cannot be treated as a mere rational 
task of producing a consistent moral system of rules and principles. Haidt (2001) also 
argued that moral judgment does not exclusively rest upon strict moral reasoning but 
on intuitions. We can think of people as intuitive philosophers struggling to create a 
consistent set of moral rules while interacting with each other and the environment. In 
order to get a full grasp of this process we need to go beyond rational cognitive 
consistency into the analysis of emotional and motivational consistency. 
Emotional consistency 
The challenges of cognitive consistency notwithstanding, there is growing 
literature advancing the position that both reason and emotions shape our moral 
convictions and determine our moral actions (Saunders, 2016). The question that 
naturally emerges is what role emotions have in shaping moral actions and whether 
emotions are a part of the internal moral system described here. If consistency with 
(and among) one’s moral principles and rules is important, should we be looking for a 
similar type of emotional consistency in moral judgment and action? If so, what 
qualifies as emotional inconsistency? 
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The starting point of our analysis is the basic distinction between self-
conscious emotions (guilt, shame, embarrassment, pride) and other-focused emotions 
(anger, contempt, disgust, elevation, gratitude, compassion) (e.g., Haidt, 2003; 
Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). In terms of consistency, we should ask whether 
certain moral norms go hand-in-hand with certain moral emotions, sometimes 
defining the nature of the moral character of a behavior. Although we could use moral 
norms to describe which emotions are moral or do the opposite, that is, use moral 
emotions to describe which norms are moral (Prinz & Nichols, 2010), we will adopt 
an SDT perspective on how both emotions and norms relate to the self. 
According to an SDT account of morality, Arvanitis (2017) argued that 
authentic moral behavior is an autonomous, self-determined form of behavior because 
it does not entail contingencies beyond the application of a moral norm. Any sense of 
‘ought’ that does not emanate from the self, in a way that the principle or rule 
underlying the behavior becomes the reason for the act, will inevitably cast doubt 
upon the moral character of the act. In this light, certain emotions would serve as a 
manifestation of authentic, autonomous motivational processes that support the 
implementation of a moral rule whereas other emotions would serve as a sign of self-
serving, distorting, defensive motivational processes. We will argue that other-
focused emotions are more likely to manifest consistency with a moral rule whereas 
self-focused emotions may in fact undermine such consistency. What we are 
essentially in search of is which emotions are intertwined with a moral rule and how 
the self can prove useful in their disentanglement from other emotions. 
Moral rules are prescriptions for interacting with other people and therefore, 
by their very nature, are directed toward others. Of course, it is the self that engages in 
moral other-oriented behavior, but the focus is on others rather than the self. The self 
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here becomes a medium for the observance of the rule and refers to the self-as-
process, the I and not the me (for this distinction see Ryan & Deci, 2017). If 
emotional consistency is important (and we argue that it is, especially with regard to 
moral integrity), emotions have to be other-oriented at the same time. For example, 
prosocial behavior would be expected to align with sympathy and compassion, that is, 
specific other-focused emotions that are pertinent to the situation and not guilt for 
failing to provide help. If the locus of attention switches from the others to the self, 
the behavior will cease to be as much about others and will start being about one’s 
own self (the self-as-me). Therefore, in helping others, self-conscious emotions will 
re-orient individuals toward the self and may trigger ego-protecting defensive 
mechanisms, possibly leading them astray from moral rules that were aimed to help 
others. We will return to this point. 
Other-focused moral emotions are also about how the behavior of others is 
consistent with moral rules, rather than only how the behavior of the self is so. They 
are directed toward upholders or violators of rules. Anger has been linked to 
individual rights violations, contempt to violations of community codes and disgust to 
violation of purity-sanctity (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; cf. Hutcherson, & 
Gross, 2011). Elevation is elicited by other people exceeding moral standards and has 
been linked to prosocial behavior. Gratitude is elicited by being benefited by others 
(Algoe, & Haidt, 2009). All the above emotions seem to align with specific norms, 
without, however, necessarily providing a one-to-one link to moral behavior. Not 
every feeling of anger or gratitude is connected to a moral rule. Not every rule has a 
corresponding emotion. Also, not all other-focused emotions exhibit the same 
properties with regard to moral behavior. For example, whereas it is easier to see how 
empathy is linked to moral social behavior, “righteous anger” can both be associated 
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with morally justifiable retribution on the one hand, and with error-prone cognitive 
biases leading to vigilantism on the other hand (Tripp & Bies, 2010). Therefore, 
other-focused moral emotions do not necessarily lead to moral behavior. Still, both 
moral rules and other-focused emotions concentrate on others, making their 
coexistence in the context of moral behavior likely. 
Self-conscious emotions have a different focus and only an indirect link to 
moral rules. Once the self-as-process behaves in a manner that is either consistent or 
inconsistent with moral rules, the behavior reflects on the self-as-me, involving the 
real or imagined evaluations of others (Leary, 2004). It is through this reflection that 
self-conscious emotions emerge (for cognitive self-evaluative models see Lewis, 
2016; Tracy & Robins, 2007). However, not all self-conscious emotions operate in the 
same way. Shame and hubristic pride are directed to global and stable properties of 
the self-concept whereas guilt and achievement-oriented pride, as well as 
embarrassment, are directed to less stable and specific situations (Tracy & Robins, 
2004). In all cases these emotions may be associated with ego-involvement, which is 
an internal self-esteem-based pressure for specific outcomes (Ryan, 1982). Ego-
involvement will trigger defensive, ego-protecting processes rather than the tendency 
to do what is right. It should be higher in cases where moral self-evaluation 
generalizes across the self-concept rather than restricted in specific situations where 
amendments may be possible. When such generalization takes place, consistency with 
a moral rule becomes more challenging because it undermines the trait self-esteem of 
the individual. Instead of adhering to a moral norm, the individual is likely to become 
defensive, even at the expense of adherence to the moral rule. Compared to more 
situational emotions, shame and hubristic pride should therefore present greater 
difficulty for behaving morally. This account may provide an explanation for why 
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shame mainly restrains immoral conduct while guilt promotes moral conduct (Sheikh, 
& Janoff-Bulman, 2010) or why hubristic, and not authentic, pride undermines moral 
behavior (Krettenauer, & Casey, 2015). It seems that the more situational the nature 
of the self-conscious emotions, the less probable that they will pose an obstacle to 
moral behavior. 
We could therefore argue that the more global and stable the attribution of a 
moral transgression or of a moral action to the self-as-me, the stronger is the control 
on the individual and the less flexibility is allowed for the self-as-process (the I) to 
accommodate and adhere to moral norms. As long as a self-conscious moral emotion 
is specifically situated, more flexibility is permitted for an alignment of cognitions 
and emotions leading to a moral act. The usefulness of self-conscious emotions in 
moral acts is therefore dependent upon the openness and flexibility with which the 
individual will process these emotions. This point can be made for moral emotions in 
general, whether they are self-conscious, such as guilt, or other-focused, such as 
anger. It is not only what type of emotions individuals experience, but how they 
regulate those emotions that matters as well. Returning to the scientist in our example, 
her decision would be considered moral if it were accompanied by love and sympathy 
for her children or the whole of humanity rather than by the experience of shame or 
guilt. Still, guilt might not be as detrimental as shame with regard to the morality of 
her decision, since it would be easier for the scientist to regulate guilt in a way that 
would not overwhelm or control her. In other words, it would be easier for her to 
regulate her behavior on the basis of what is right rather than on the basis of what 
would protect her self-esteem. 
When faced with a moral dilemma, individuals will probably not be 
experiencing a single emotion. Any social situation requiring moral judgment could 
CONSISTENCY AND MORAL INTEGRITY                                                                               14 
 
 
  
evoke different types of emotions. For example, people may find it difficult to accept 
a moral norm that runs contrary to their interests, their past behavior, or another moral 
rule, thereby invoking, say, anxiety or guilt, alongside gratitude or compassion. The 
feelings can be overwhelming or overcontrolled, leading to rigid adherence to 
incoherent principles. Instead, the same emotions can be mindfully perceived and 
treated as informational inputs for moral growth and integrity. Such flexibility is 
offered by the capacity to manage volitionally one’s emotions, a capacity called 
emotional integration (Ryan, Deci, Grolnick, & La Guardia, 2006). It involves being 
open even to negative emotions, which, if mindfully processed, can result in 
subsequent lower arousal and better cognitive functioning, when compared to 
emotional distancing (Roth et al., 2018; Roth, Vansteenkiste, & Ryan, 2019). Through 
integrative emotion regulation, it is likely that emotional conflict will be approached 
with high flexibility, leading in turn to an alignment of moral rules and emotions, i.e. 
emotional consistency. 
Moral integrity does not simply refer to a property of the individual that 
causes moral behavior in one, isolated instance, but in a substantial range of 
situations. If, as we have argued, a behavior is considered moral only when it is 
consistent with a moral rule, cognitions and emotions should point toward the 
adherence of that rule through an integrated, rather than fragmented, mode of 
functioning. Otherwise, a fragmented self would apply different criteria to similar 
situations and exhibit contradictory emotions. Both cognitions and emotions would 
then be part of the internal moral system that guides moral behavior. In order to better 
understand how moral emotions and moral norms may harmoniously combine to 
induce moral behavior we need to probe deeper into the motivational process of 
integration. 
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Motivational consistency 
An important psychological question that arises from the discussion above is how 
impersonal ought standards, which are irrespective of a person’s wishes (Heider, 
1958), become integrated in the self and create a consistent set of moral principles and 
rules that are harmoniously intertwined with corresponding moral emotions across 
different types of situations. In this section, we will explore how this internal moral 
system develops through the motivational process of integration. In our view, 
motivation is a central element of moral behavior and any inconsistency on this level 
could deeply undermine it. 
 Self-Determination Theory adopts an organismic-dialectical perspective, 
stressing the inherent potential of the organism to actualize its potentials, integrate 
new experiences and aspects of the environment and operate from a unified, coherent 
self. At the same time, it focuses on the active role of the environment in nurturing or 
thwarting these intrinsic tendencies (Ryan & Deci, 2002). The interaction between the 
individual and the environment can result in differing levels of integrity, ranging from 
a whole and coherent self (wherein different aspects, cognitive and emotional, are 
harmoniously interconnected) to a fragmented, reactive self (wherein different aspects 
are isolated from each other). 
Moral integrity should be subject to the same fundamental process of 
organismic integration. If, as we have argued, consistency with a moral rule is 
achieved when a person has achieved both cognitive and emotional consistency, this 
is more easily attainable when operating from an integrated, rather than a fragmented 
self. According to SDT, this distinction is not dichotomous, but can be represented 
along a continuum. We will analyze this continuum in terms of the example of 
prosocial behavior, which is generally seen as moral behavior. We will begin with 
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less autonomous types of motivation and end with the most autonomous types of 
motivation.  
On the one end there is amotivation, the most alienated form of motivation, 
where a person sees no value in acting or does not feel competent enough to engage in 
prosocial behavior. Next is external regulation, where a person, for example, engages 
in prosocial behavior in order to attain a monetary reward or avoid a fine. This 
behavior will not generally be considered moral because the primary motive here is 
the attainment of a reward or the avoidance of punishment rather than the moral rule 
itself. Next comes introjected regulation, where a person engages in prosocial 
behavior in order to maintain or enhance self-worth. The person has only partly 
internalized the importance of prosocial behavior and behaves morally primarily to 
avoid self-administered punishments, such as guilt or shame, and attain self-
administered rewards, such as pride. This is an important and complicated form of 
motivation with regard to morality, since it is associated with most self-conscious 
emotions.  Assor, Vansteenkiste, and Kaplan (2009) make a useful distinction 
between introjected avoidance and introjected approach motivation (the former aims 
at the avoidance of low self-worth and the latter aims at the attainment of high self-
worth) and find introjected avoidance motivation more controlling and less 
autonomous than introjected approach motivation. In relation to self-focused 
emotions, an interesting topic of research might be whether shame and hubristic pride 
operate more on the level of introjected avoidance motivation whereas guilt, 
embarrassment and authentic pride more on the level of introjected approach 
motivation. However, neither of these types of motivation exhibit the autonomy that 
would be expected in terms of a self-endorsed adoption of a moral rule. 
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A more autonomous type of motivation is regulation through identification, 
where a person identifies with the value of prosocial behavior. Although the person 
here identifies with the moral rule, thereby making the rule a deciding factor of 
behavior, identifications in general may still remain compartmentalized especially if 
associated with negative events (see Weinstein, Deci, & Ryan, 2011). At the level of 
integrated regulation though, prosocial behavior should be deeply assimilated and in 
full coherence with a person’s whole system of values, principles and rules. Acting in 
accordance with a rule becomes a natural extension of the self and is autonomously 
regulated. It is at this type of motivation that we would expect to find the level of 
cognitive and emotional consistency we have been arguing for. Integration, for 
example, would ensure that a person would not exhibit self-fragmentation allowing 
him to be both a loving father and a ruthless entrepreneur at the same time. Finally, 
there is intrinsic regulation, where individuals engage in prosocial behavior because 
they find it satisfying and enjoyable. Τhis type of motivation is associated more with 
intrinsic inclinations than with a moral rule and therefore cannot be classified as 
moral behavior in terms of motivation and moral integrity (for more on this, see 
Arvanitis, 2017). 
Although the preceding analysis provides a roadmap for understanding the 
type of motivation that is connected to moral behavior, it does not explain how and 
when integration can be supported. Drawing on the work of Deci et al. (1994), who 
studied how people develop self-regulation for activities that are not inherently 
satisfying, Arvanitis (2017) proposed that three contextual events will allow for 
integration of moral norms: providing meaningful rationale for the adoption of a 
moral norm, acknowledging the feelings of conflict between an inclination and the 
adoption of a moral norm, and conveying choice so that a person is allowed to take 
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responsibility. A closer look will reveal that the underlying psychological processes 
may in fact be related to the three types of consistency that have been analyzed above.  
Firstly, providing meaningful rationale is closely connected to cognitive 
consistency. Showing people that a specific moral norm is consistent with values and 
principles that they already endorse is likely to facilitate a cognitive process of 
alignment of this norm with the true self. It therefore provides the cognitive basis for 
the adoption (i.e., integration) of a moral norm. This type of cognitive consistency 
does not necessarily extend to emotions. Secondly, acknowledging possible feelings of 
conflict is supportive of the process of emotional integration. It invites individuals to 
process emotions non-defensively and act according to deeply held values. Such a 
process will be facilitated if emotional conflict is acknowledged in the first place. 
Thirdly, equally important for integration is the conveyance of choice as well as a 
sense of responsibility. Keeping in mind that cognitive and emotional consistency is 
not achieved in a vacuum, but within the person, the ‘self’ represents the most 
important aspect of integration. It is the center of the whole process, which brings all 
other cognitions and emotions in line with it. When this type of motivational 
consistency is achieved, it will be accompanied by a sense of choice and 
responsibility. As evidenced by Deci et al. (1994), the opposite also holds: offering 
choice supports integration.  In fact, their research shows that all the above-mentioned 
contextual events facilitate integration whereas limited presence or lack thereof leads 
to introjection.  
 The motivational aspect of integration and the nutrients that support it is best 
captured by SDT’s concept of needs, treated as “innate psychological nutriments that 
are essential for ongoing psychological growth, integrity and well-being” (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000, p. 229). Research in the field has identified three basic psychological 
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needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness that, when satisfied, lead to integrity 
and growth, or, when thwarted, lead to fragmentation and defensiveness (Ryan & 
Deci, 2017). The more an environment is supportive of the three needs, the more the 
organism is able to bring experiences into a unity.  Arvanitis (2017) argued that 
environmental principles that create need-supportive environments are likely to be 
integrated themselves and will therefore represent authentic moral principles. 
The whole procedure discussed so far goes beyond simple cognitive or 
emotional consistency and ascribes a central role to the natural intrinsic growth 
tendencies of the self that energize the whole process of moral behavior. In this sense, 
it is the self that determines the moral character of an act or, in other words, moral 
integrity is the defining property of moral behavior. On the question of whether the 
integrated self is capable of producing consistent behavior, Koestner, Bernieri, and 
Zuckerman (1992) found that individuals who self-regulate are more likely to behave 
accordingly with their attitudes and traits. Similar future research in the field of moral 
psychology will ideally serve as a test for the type of motivational consistency that we 
describe above. 
From consistency to moral integrity 
In the preceding discussion of consistency, the self plays a central role and serves as 
the main link among the three types of (in)consistencies. In all three types, we 
basically refer to the consistency of behavior with a moral principle or rule, not as it 
might appear on the outside, but from within the self. In order to better understand 
how such consistency manifests itself we focused on cognitions, emotions and 
motives.  In terms of cognitive consistency, moral rules and principles have to align 
with each other to form a coherent set of imperatives that is liable to the distortion of 
cognitive dissonance when there are discrepancies with the self-attribute of morality. 
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In terms of emotional consistency, moral rules and principles have to align with 
emotions that are not connected to introjects and contingent self-esteem but are, 
instead, autonomously processed by the self through integrative emotion regulation. 
In terms of motivational consistency, intrinsic tendencies have to align with moral 
principles and corresponding emotions so that rules and emotions are properly 
integrated in the self.  In the end, the integrated self is where cognitions, emotions and 
motives align in order to produce moral behavior. This alignment creates an internal 
moral system that, we submit, lies at the core of moral integrity.  
 The level of moral integrity essentially corresponds to the quality of that 
internal moral system. The more individuals integrate moral principles during the 
interaction with their environment the more it becomes broad, refined and honed in a 
manner that it produces moral behavior across diverse situations that are often 
characterized by demanding moral dilemmas. As long as people operate from 
integrated regulations, they will act consistently with the moral principles they have 
integrated. 
Different types of situations would, of course, pose different types of moral 
dilemmas. As individuals are faced with such dilemmas, it is how they interact with 
their environment that determines whether they will operate from an integrated self or 
from a fragmented self. On the one hand, an environment which is need-supportive, 
that is, conducive to the satisfaction of the three basic psychological needs for 
autonomy, competence and relatedness, is more likely to help the individual process 
the situation openly and behave according to inherent values and principles. On the 
other hand, irrespective of environmental need support, individuals may have a 
propensity for the development of moral integrity. High reasoning skills would 
support cognitive consistency, high other-focused empathy (that is, an affective 
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reaction that is more appropriate to the conditions of others - see Hoffman, 2001) 
would support emotional consistency, and an autonomy orientation (Deci & Ryan, 
1985) would support motivational consistency, all of which may be properly 
considered as aspects of moral character. Moral integrity is likely to arise during -
different- need supportive situations that pose moral dilemmas for an individual who, 
in turn, has the propensity to achieve all types of moral consistency. 
A question worth considering is what type of moral principles would a person 
of moral integrity be expected to endorse under this SDT perspective. A first attempt 
at answering this question was offered, on the basis of a procedural account of 
morality that builds on the principles of organismic integration, by Arvanitis (2017). 
He argued that an SDT account of morality would not be relativistic, but universal, in 
a way in which Kantian morality is universal. People would not integrate norms that 
often require the threat of punishment in order to be maintained, such as the “ideals” 
put forward by authoritarian regimes, and would instead integrate moral principles 
that are often advocated by established theories of political and moral philosophy. To 
take this reasoning further, the moral system constitutes a system of coherent, well-
aligned moral principles that the individual actively and reflectively brings into 
congruence with other aspects of the self. This process involves a possible 
modification of principles and accommodation with other internalized principles. A 
person of moral integrity, that is a person with a highly developed moral system, will 
have undergone an arduous process of constant assessment of principles that would 
make the endorsement of broadly considered immoral principles highly unlikely. Of 
note, these ideas have to be empirically tested in order to gain more support. 
These points support the view that integrity is closely connected to the process 
of self-integration and can be further explored through the lens of SDT in the way that 
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we have described. Coming to consistently abide by our higher-order moral principles 
is a complex process which involves all three of the above sub-processes (the 
cognitive, the emotional and, perhaps most obviously, the motivational). This 
complex process is better described not as a lonely consideration of abstract principles 
but as a combination of these sub-processes, which heavily depend on environmental 
stimuli and support. Therefore, in order to be moral, our scientist does not simply 
need to answer the question ‘which principle is more important for you?’ as a 
philosopher would in a scholarly article. Neither can she rely on an abstract positive 
moral character trait of hers. Depending on her propensities, experiences and 
environmental support she will have developed an internal moral system of motives, 
principles and emotions, which will facilitate the consistent application of her higher-
order principles to practical situations. As difficult as it may be to achieve, this is the 
essence of moral integrity.    
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